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No nosocomial transmission under
standard hygiene precautions in short
term contact patients in case of an
unexpected ESBL or Q&A E. coli positive
patient: a one-year prospective cohort
study within three regional hospitals
Dennis Souverein1* , Sjoerd M. Euser1, Bjorn L. Herpers1, Corry Hattink2, Patricia Houtman3, Amerens Popma3,
Jan Kluytmans4,5, John W. A. Rossen6 and Jeroen W. Den Boer1
Abstract
Background: Many Highly Resistant Gram Negative Rod (HR-GNR) positive patients are found unexpectedly in
clinical cultures, besides patients who are screened and isolated based on risk factors. As unexpected HR-GNR
positive patients are isolated after detection, transmission to contact patients possibly occurred. The added value of
routine contact tracing in such situations within hospitals with standard hygiene precautions is unknown.
Methods: In 2014, this study was performed as a prospective cohort study. Index patients were defined as those
tested unexpectedly HR-GNR positive in clinical cultures to diagnose a possible infection and were nursed under
standard hygiene precautions before tested positive. After detection they were nursed in contact isolation. Contact
patients were still hospitalized and shared the same room with the index patient for at least 12 h. HR-GNR
screening was performed by culturing a rectal and throat swab. Clonal relatedness of HR-GNR isolates was
determined using whole genome sequencing (WGS).
Results: Out of 152 unexpected HR-GNR positive patients, 35 patients (23.0%) met our inclusion criteria for index
patient. ESBL E. coli was found most frequently (n = 20, 57.1%), followed by Q&A E. coli (n = 10, 28.6%), ESBL K.
pneumoniae (n = 3, 8.5%), ESBL R. ornithinolytica (n = 1, 2.9%) and multi resistant P. aeruginosa (n = 1, 2.9%). After
contact tracing, 69 patients were identified as contact patient of an index patient, with a median time between
start of contact and sampling of 3 days. None were found HR-GNR positive by nosocomial transmission.
Conclusions: In a local setting within hospitals with standard hygiene precautions, routine contact tracing among
unexpected HR-GNR positive patients may be replaced by appropriate surveillance as we found no nosocomial
transmission in short term contacts.
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Background
Infections with Highly Resistant Gram Negative Rods
(HR-GNRs) are associated with higher (hospital) costs,
morbidity and mortality in comparison to susceptible
micro-organisms [1–4]. Increasingly, studies report on
the (colonization) prevalence of HR-GNRs, including
ESBL (Extended Spectrum Beta Lactamase) producing
bacteria isolated from hospitalized patients, general
practitioner patients and nursing home residents [5–9].
Knowledge about regional prevalence rates is important
since HR-GNR colonized patients constitute a potential
reservoir for patients at risk for nosocomial infections,
such as immune compromised patients and/or patients
with open wounds [10–13]. Several studies showed that
foreign travel is an important risk factor for HR-GNR
colonization [14–16]. Therefore, in Dutch hospitals,
patients who have a recent history of foreign hospital ad-
mission are actively screened and pre-emptively isolated
until test results are known [17]. In addition, known
HR-GNR positive patients are flagged in the Hospital
Information System (HIS) and isolated when readmitted.
Despite screening and isolation of high risk patients,
numerous patients are found unexpectedly HR-GNR
positive in clinical cultures to diagnose a possible infec-
tion [18]. Before detection these unexpected positive pa-
tients were not nursed in isolation so that transmission
to other patients may have occurred since no specific
infection control measures were taken except standard
hygiene procedures.
Willemsen et al. showed that the nosocomial transmis-
sion rate of HR-GNRs in Dutch hospitals was 7.0%, using
AFLP (Amplification Fragment Length Polymorphism) to
determine the genetic relation between clinical isolates
[18]. Tschudin-Sutter et al. showed that nosocomial
transmission from unexpected ESBL positive patients to
contact patients rarely occurs, with a transmission rate of
2.2% over a total study period of 11 years [19]. Based on
these studies it could be questioned if contact tracing
within hospitals with standard hygiene precautions is re-
quired as contact tracing is considered time consuming
and expensive. For the development of future health pol-
icies the results of such studies are of major importance.
In the present study, the nosocomial transmission rate
from unexpected HR-GNR positive patients to contact
patients was studied within three regional hospitals in the
Dutch region Kennemerland. In addition, we estimated
the overall HR-GNR incidence including patients who
were screened and pre-emptively isolated at admission.
Methods
Study design and setting
The present study was performed as a prospective co-
hort study. Three hospitals in the region Kennemerland
participated in this study. Hospital one is a 260-bed
regional hospital (37% private, 26% double and 37%
multi-patient rooms), hospital two is a 400 bed teaching
hospital (50% private, 25% double and 25% multi-patient
rooms) and hospital three is a 400 bed teaching hospital
(46% private, 37% double and 17% multi-patient rooms).
A database was created including patient and laboratory
information from index and contact patients. Data were
collected in 2014 as part of each hospitals infection
control program.
Definition of HR-GNR
HR-GNR definitions were based on the Dutch MDRO
(Multi-Drug Resistant Organism) directive for hospitals
[18, 20]. HR-GNRs considered in the present study were
(1) Enterobacteriaceae that were Extended Spectrum
Beta-Lactamase (ESBL) and/or carbapenemase positive
(CPE) and/or resistant to Fluoroquinolones and Amino-
glycosides (Q&A), (2) Acinetobacter species that were
carbapenemase positive and/or resistant to Q&A, (3)
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia resistant to co-trimoxazole
and (4) multi-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa, defined
as resistant to at least three of the following antibiotics or
antibiotic groups: piperacillin, ceftazidime, fluoroquino-
lones, aminoglycosides and/or carbapenemase positive.
Definition of index patients, contact patients and
infection control procedures
Independent of the sampled body site, patients who
tested unexpectedly HR-GNR positive in clinical cultures
were considered as index patient. Unexpected positive
was defined as patients who were not earlier identified
as HR-GNR carrier (not flagged in the HIS) and/or not
screened because of an elevated risk at admission
(history of foreign hospital admission or coming from a
hospital with a known HR-GNR problem). Index pa-
tients were identified by the infection control depart-
ment based on daily communicated laboratory results.
Contact patients were defined as patients who were still
hospitalized and shared the same room with the index
patient for at least 12 h, while the index patient was
nursed under standard hygiene precautions, which in-
cludes wearing gloves after entering the patients room
(before performing any patient-care activity) and wearing
an apron when handling contagious materials. Hand
hygiene was performed according to the five moments
of the WHO hand hygiene guideline [21]. Screening of
contact patients was performed by sampling a rectal and
throat swab (Copan eSwab including 1 mL of modified
liquid Amies) supplemented with wound samples when
present as soon as possible after detection of the index
patient. Index patients with at least one contact patient
(still hospitalized at the time of detection) were included
in the study. After detection, all HR-GNR positive
patients were nursed in contact isolation following the
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national MDRO directive [18]. Contact isolation
consisted of nursing in a single room, using gloves by
nursing personnel and daily disinfection of the patient
room. For all HR-GNR positive patients, isolation
measures were maintained during the total admission
time and study period. HR-GNR positive patients were
not unmarked during the study period and an alert was
entered in the HIS as a warning when patients were
readmitted.
Sampling of patients and laboratory techniques
All samples were processed and analysed using Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) at the Regional Public
Health Laboratory Kennemerland (RPHLK). Samples
from unexpected HR-GNR positive patients (index
patients) were analysed using standard microbiological
procedures. When the index patient was positive for a
HR-GNR (including ESBLs) rectal and throat swabs
from contact patient(s) were analysed by direct culturing
on both an ESBL screening agar (ChromID ESBL-ID,
bioMerieux, enriched with a mixture of antibiotics, in-
cluding cefpodoxime) and a CLED GM20 agar (cystine
lactose electrolyte deficient agar with 20 mg/L gentami-
cin, Oxoid). All gram-negative rods growing on these
agars were identified using MALDI-TOF (Bruker
Daltonics, Germany). Antibiotic susceptibility testing
was performed using the automated system VITEK2
(bioMérieux, France). All isolates suspected for the pro-
duction of ESBL, defined as a VITEK 2 AES alert and/or
elevated MIC (> 1 mg/L) for cefotaxime and/or ceftazi-
dime were confirmed using the combination disk method
(ceftazidime and cefotaxime or cefepime with and without
clavulanic acid). Isolates with a VITEK 2 AES alert and/or
elevated MIC for meropenem (> 0.25 mg/L) were sus-
pected for carbapenemase production. Carbapenemase
production was analysed using the modified Hodge test
and an in-house carbapenemase PCR with targets for
KPC, VIM, OXA-48 and NDM [22–24]. All HR-GNR
positive isolates were stored at −80 °C.
Molecular typing of HR-GNR positive isolates
Isolates with similar micro-organism and HR-GNR type
within index and contact patient(s) were genotyped
using Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) using the
MiSeq instrument (Illumina) as described elsewhere
[25]. De novo assembly was performed using CLC Gen-
omics Workbench v7.0.3 (CLC bio A/S, Aarhus,
Denmark) after quality trimming (Qs ≥ 28) with optimal
word sizes based on the maximum N50 value. The
sequence type (ST) was identified by uploading the
assembled genomes to the multilocus sequence type
(MLST) server (version 1.7) and the acquired resistance
genes were determined with the CGE Resfinder 1.2 tool.
Pairwise genetic distance between isolates was calculated
for whole genome (wgMLST) targets and core genome
(cgMLST) targets by dividing the number of allele
differences by the total number of targets shared by both
sequences and reported as proportion. Based on previ-
ously described methods, E. coli isolates with a genetic
distance of 0.95% or less were interpreted as clonally
related [25].
Data analysis and definition of transmission
The transmission rate from index patients to contact
patients was calculated by dividing the number of
confirmed positive contact patients by the number of
index patients, including those for whom no transmis-
sion had occurred. For every index and contact patient
the following variables were calculated: contact time, de-
fined as the period that the index patient and contact
patient shared the same room; admission time; and time
to sampling for the contact patient (after identification
of the index patient). The overall cumulative HR-GNR
incidence and incidence density for the study period was
calculated by dividing the number of HR-GNR positive
hospitalized patients by the total number of admissions
and (hospital) patient-days. Confidence intervals (95%)
for proportions were calculated using the Wilson score
[26]. All statistical analyses were performed using IBM
SPSS Statistics version 24.0.
Results
Characteristics of index and contact patients
Thirty-five out of 152 unexpected HR-GNR positive
patients (23.0%) met our inclusion criteria and were
marked as index patient. Consequently, 117 HR-GNR
positive patients (77.0%) were excluded since no contact
patients were identified or were already discharged.
Around these index patients 69 patients were identified
as contact patient (Fig. 1). Two contact patients (2.9%)
were screened since they had contact on the Intensive
Care Unit (ICU) with an index patient. The median
number (range) of contact patients per index patient
was 2 (1–5) and the median contact time (range) be-
tween index and contact patients was 2 days (0.5–9).
Thirteen out of the 35 index patients (37.1%) and 44 out
of the 69 contact patients (63.8%) were male and the
mean age (SD) for index and contact patients was 72.1
(12.0) and 70.7 (15.2) years, respectively. The median
admission time (range) for index and contact patients
was 10 (2–36) and 11 (1–133) days and the median
number of (hospital room) transfers (range) for index
and contact patients were 3 (1–8) and 2 (1–9) transfers,
respectively. The number of contact patients who used
antibiotics and/or had open wounds at the time of
sampling was 25 (36.2%) and 13 (18.8%) respectively.
Stratified patient characteristics per hospital are shown
in Table 1.
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HR-GNR types and micro-organisms of ‘index patients’
Of all 35 index patients, 20 patients were found ESBL E.
coli positive (57.1%), followed by Q&A E. coli (n = 10,
28.6%), ESBL K. pneumoniae (n = 3, 8.5%), ESBL R.
ornithinolytica (n = 1, 2.9%) and multi resistant P. aeru-
ginosa (n = 1, 2.9%).
Transmission analysis
In total, five out of 69 contact patients (7.2%) were
found HR-GNR positive. All of these contact patients
were associated with a different index patient. Four of
these patients were ESBL E. coli positive and one patient
was positive for a Q&A E. coli. Three of the five HR-
GNR positive contact patients were positive with a
different HR-GNR type and/or micro-organism com-
pared to their index patient and were therefore consid-
ered negative for nosocomial transmission. Two of the
five HR-GNR positive contact patients were positive
with the same HR-GNR type and micro-organism as
their index patient (both ESBL E. coli). WGS of the
ESBL E. coli isolates of index 1 and contact 1 showed
that the isolate of index 1 was genotyped as ST 131,
CTX-M-27. The isolate of contact 1 was genotyped as
ST 295, SHV-12. The genetic difference between these
isolates was determined using cgMLST and wgMLST
and showed a genetic difference of 95.8% and 97.5%
(Table 2). WGS of the ESBL E. coli isolates of index 2
and contact 2 showed that the isolate of index 2 was
Fig. 1 Flowchart of admitted patients, HR-GNR screening and unexpected HR-GNR positive patients. *Two patients were positive for two HR-GNR
types (one patient was ESBL and CPE positive and one patient was ESBL and multi-resistant P. Aeruginosa positive)
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genotyped as ST 69, CTX-M-1 and the isolate of contact
2 as ST 69, CTX-M-55. The genetic difference using
cgMLST was 11.6%, and 13.6% when using wgMLST
(Table 2). Based on the WGS data we concluded that
nosocomial transmission had not occurred in both cases.
Consequently, the overall nosocomial transmission rate
(95% CI) of unexpected HR-GNR and HR-GNR E. coli
positive patients to contact patients was 0% (0–9.9) and
0% (0–11.4).
ST sequence type, wgMLST whole genome multilocus
sequence typing, cgMLST core genome multilocus se-
quence typing
Incidence of HR-GNRs
In 2014, 15 out of 103 patients (14.6%) were HR-GNR
positive as part risk factor based screening at admission
(Fig. 1). In addition, 152 patients were unexpected HR-
GNR positive in clinical cultures during hospitalization.
Together with five positive contacts this resulted in a total
of 172 HR-GNR positive patients during hospitalization.
Given a total of 61,817 admissions and 223,351 (hospital)
patient-days this resulted in a cumulative incidence
(95% CI) and incidence density (95% CI) of 27.8 (24.0–
32.3) patients per 10,000 admissions and 7.7 (6.6–8.9)
patients per 10,000 (hospital) patient-days, respectively.
As shown in Table 3, 68.6% (n = 118) of all HR-GNR posi-
tive patients tested positive for an ESBL. We expect based
on the detected prevalence within contact patients (7.2%)
that 4450 admissions were with patients that were HR-
GNR colonized (7.2% of 61,817 admissions).
Discussion
During a study period of 1 year, a nosocomial transmis-
sion rate of 0% from unexpected HR-GNR positive
patients to contact patients was found. Out of 152 unex-
pected HR-GNR positive patients, 35 patients met our
inclusion criteria for index patients. Around these 35
index patients, 69 contact patients were sampled,
accounting for a total of 178 contact days. Although no
nosocomial transmission had occurred, five contact
patients were HR-GNR positive (7.2%) and four of these
were ESBL E. coli positive (5.8%), which corresponds
with earlier reported prevalence rates in Dutch hospitals
[6, 27]. As expected, ESBL positive patients were found
most frequently among all HR-GNR positive patients
(68.6%) and index patients (68.6%). From a micro-
organism perspective, 85.7% of the index patients were
positive for an HR-GNR E. coli. MRSA, VRE (Vancomycin-
resistant Enterococcus) and PRSP (Penicillin-resistant
Streptococcus pneumoniae) were not included in the
present study.
Other studies with comparable study designs that
estimated the transmission rate to contact patients are
scarce, limiting the comparison with other settings.
Willemsen et al. showed that the nosocomial transmission
rate of HR-GNR in Dutch hospitals was 7.0% [18]. This is
probably a worst-case scenario since only epidemiologically
Table 1 Characteristics of index and contact patients
Regional Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3
Index Contacts Index Contacts Index Contacts Index Contacts
Number of patients 35 69 13 35 8 13 14 21
Sex
Male (%) 13 (37.1%) 44 (63.8%) 5 (38.5%) 21 (60.0%) 4 (50.0%) 7 (53.8%) 4 (28.6%) 16 (76.2%)
Mean age (SD) 72.1 (12.0) 70.7 (15.2) 73.3 (11.5) 74.9 (14.7) 65.9 (13.7) 70.3 (13.3) 74.5 (11.0) 64.0 (15.1)
Median number of contacts (range) 2 (1–5) NA 3 (1–4) NA 1 (1–5) NA 1 (1–3) NA
Median admission time in days (range) 10 (2–36) 11 (1–133) 10 (2–24) 10 (2–48) 11.5 (5–32) 12 (8–29) 8 (4–36) 12 (1–133)
Median number of transfers (range) 3 (1–8) 2 (1–9) 3 (2–8) 2 (1–9) 3.5 (2–8) 3 (2–6) 2 (1–4) 2 (1–5)
Median contact time in days (range) NA 2 (0.5–9) NA 1 (0.5–6) NA 4 (1–6) NA 3 (0.5–9)
Median time between end of contact
and sampling (range)
NA 1 (−2–12) NA 1 (−1–8) NA 2 (0–12) NA 0 (−2–7)
Wounds (%) NA 13 (18.8%) NA 6 (17.1%) NA 2 (15.4%) NA 5 (23.8%)
Antibiotic use during sampling (%) NA 25 (36.2%) NA 13 (37.1%) NA 6 (46.2%) NA 6 (28.6%)
NA not applicable
Table 2 Index patients with possible transmission
Pair Index Contact Genetic difference (wgMLST) Genetic difference (cgMLST) Conclusion
1 E. coli (ST131; CTX-M-27) E. coli (ST295; SHV-12) 97.5% (3138/3219) 95.8% (2647/2764) No nosocomial transmission
2 E. coli (ST69; CTX-M-1) E. coli (ST69; CTX-M-55) 13.6% (439/3219) 11.6% (321/2764) No nosocomial transmission
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linked clinical isolates within a time window of 4 weeks
were analysed using AFLP genotyping, which is considered
less discriminatory. In 2012, Tschudin-Sutter et al. studied
the transmission rate from unexpected ESBL positive
patients to contact patients [19]. Their results showed that
during a period of 11 years two contact patients related to
93 index patients (2.2%) were ESBL positive by transmis-
sion, suggesting that nosocomial transmission rarely oc-
curs. A study performed at the ICU in a French hospital
showed an ESBL acquisition rate of 6.5% [28]. However,
only one patient (out of 19) appeared to be positive by
nosocomial transmission. A complicating factor for these
studies (and also for our study) is the relatively high ESBL
colonization prevalence in the community. We only
detected 172 of these patients during our study period
instead of an expected amount of 4450 admissions with
HR-GNR positive patients. Consequently, expensive high
resolution genotyping is needed to exclude transmission
since phenotypic results, MLST, AFLP or ESBL gene are
not able to discriminate enough between closely related
isolates [25, 29]. Based on MLST and ESBL group alone
we would have concluded that transmission had
occurred between one index and a contact patient.
Additional cgMLST or wgMLST analyses, as performed
in the present study minimizes the chance on this kind
of false conclusions. Another interesting study within a
German hospital showed a nosocomial transmission
rate of 2.3% for multidrug resistant E. coli based on
clinical (infection) isolates using cgMLST [30]. When
isolation measures of positive patients were ceased the
transmission rate increased non-significantly to 5.0%
and decreased on high risk wards (ICU). However, as
these results were based on clinical infection cultures
only, colonized (not infected) patients were missed,
underestimating the real transmission rate.
Our results and the previously mentioned studies clues
that routine contact tracing in case of an unexpected HR-
GNR positive patient might be replaced by appropriate sur-
veillance in a local setting within hospitals with standard
hygiene precautions. Also, since we found no nosocomial
transmission, these results advocate a more flexible isola-
tion strategy. However, (cluster) randomized controlled tri-
als are needed to compare nosocomial transmission rates
between different isolation strategies. Preferably such stud-
ies must be accompanied by adverse events that are associ-
ated with isolation (such as patient well-being) so that a
balanced conclusion could be made. Because we mainly
isolated HR-GNR E. coli, our results should be interpreted
with caution and cannot simply be generalized for less
frequently isolated HR-GNRs such as CPE or other micro-
organisms than E. coli such as K. pneumoniae.
Some studies have suggested that certain sequence types
of E. coli (ST 131) and K. pneumoniae (ST 258) are
hyperendemic, causing outbreaks and infections [31, 32].
A recent review found evidence that E. coli ST 131 is
more pathogenic than non-ST131, but the increased
transmissibility or prolonged carriage could not be
confirmed [33]. For K. pneumoniae ST 258, this study
could not confirm or reject the increased pathogenicity,
transmissibility or prolonged carriage of this sequence
type [33]. As certain HR-GNR types or micro-organisms
are potentially more dangerous in terms of transmissibility
or pathogenicity, contact tracing can only be replaced in a
local setting within hospitals where adequate standard
hygiene precautions with sufficient surveillance or
prevalence measurements are performed. Prevalence
Table 3 Total HR-GNR incidence for 2014
Regional Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3
ESBL 118 40 37 41
Q&A 54 14 20 20
CPE 3 1 0 2
S. maltophilia resistant to co-trimoxazole 1 1 0 0
MR P. aeruginosa 5 3 1 1
Total number of HR-GNR 181 59 58 64
Number unique HR-GNR positive patientsa 172 53 57 62
Number of admissions 61,817 18,837 23,637 19,343
Number of patient days 223,351 57,749 92,070 73,533
HR-GNR incidence rate per 10.000 admissions (95% CI) 27.8 (24.0–32.3) 28.1 (21.5–36.8) 24.1 (18.6–31.2) 32.1 (25.0–41.1)
HR-GNR incidence density per 10.000 patient-days (95% CI) 7.7 (6.6–8.9) 9.2 (7.0–12.0) 6.2 (4.8–8.0) 8.4 (6.6–10.8)
aRepresents the number of unique patients. During admission, a patient could be positive for more than one HR-GNR type. Therefore, this number is lower than
the sum of all HR-GNR subgroups
HR-GNR Highly Resistant Gram Negative Rod, MR multi resistant, ESBL extended spectrum beta lactamase, Q&A enterobacteriaceae or Acinetobacter spp. resistant
to fluoroquinolones and aminoglycosides, CPE carbapenemase producing enterobacteriaceae
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measurements will provide insight into local HR-GNR epi-
demiology and possible ongoing transmission within
hospitals [27]. Appropriate surveillance could be performed
by reviewing (1) clinical HR-GNR isolates, (2) patient
admission data and (3) genotyping of HR-GNR
isolates when transmission is suspected as performed
by Mellmann et al. [30].
Comparing our overall cumulative HR-GNR incidence
rate with the study of Willemsen et al. showed a lower cu-
mulative incidence rate per 10,000 admissions (28 vs. 39)
[18]. An explanation for this difference could be the large
variation between hospitals, hospital types and patient
populations that were included in both studies. Compar-
ing the incidence density per 100,000 patient-days
between both studies showed a higher incidence density
in our study (77 vs. 55) [18]. The mean length of stay in
our study was 3.6 days compared to 6.6 days, resulting in
a lower denominator of patient-days. This decreasing
trend of mean length of stay within Dutch hospitals was
also noticed in a Dutch report published in 2013 [34].
The present study has several limitations. First, the
sample size (35 index and 69 contact patients) was rela-
tively small which is reflected by the large confidence
interval of the calculated transmission rate. Future stud-
ies are necessary to confirm our results. Second, for VRE
(Vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus) it is known that the
inoculum size is related to the detection probability with
culturing [35]. For HR-GNR detection it is largely
unknown how much time between colonization and
sampling (using culturing) is sufficient. This may have
resulted in a possible underestimation of the nosocomial
transmission rate in our study, as some patients could
have been marked as false negative. However, the median
time between start of contact and sampling in our study
was 3 days (median contact time plus time between end
of contact and sampling), and we therefore do not think
that this has markedly influenced our results. Future
studies must incorporate repeated culturing after the end
of contact in order to determine the optimal culturing
strategy. Third, our results cannot be solely attributed to
the transmission capacity of HR-GNR type or micro-
organism alone. In a setting, with other prevalence
rates or infection control policies other transmission
rates could be found. Fourth, we have possibly missed
cases of transmission, since only admitted index and
contact patients were included in our study.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our study provides evidence that the
nosocomial transmission rate from unexpected HR-GNR
positive patients towards short term contacts patients in a
local setting within hospitals with standard hygiene pre-
cautions is low. In a local setting routine contact tracing
among unexpected HR-GNR positive patients may be
replaced by appropriate surveillance. As we mainly iso-
lated ESBL E. coli and Q&A E. coli, our results cannot be
extrapolated to other HR-GNR types such as CPE or other
micro-organisms such as K. pneumoniae.
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